INTRODUCTION
The saving of seed exerts a powerful rhetorical grip on American agricultural law and policy. Simply put, farmers want to save seed. Many farmers-and many of their advocates-believe that saving seed is essential to farming. But it is not. Farmers today often buy seed, just as they buy other agricultural inputs. That way lies the path of economic and technological progress. Seed-saving advocates protest that compelling farmers to buy seed every season effectively subjects them to a form of serfdom.
1 So be it. Intellectual property law concerns the progress of science and the useful arts. Collateral economic and social damage, in the form of affronts to the agrarian ego, is of no valid legal concern. The harvest is past, the summer is ended, and seed is not saved. 2 True to the "rhetorical formula" drawn by Puritan orators from the Hebrew prophets Jeremiah and Isaiah, this Article will deliver a jeremiad, "recalling the courage and piety of the founders, lamenting recent and present ills, and crying out for a return to the original conduct and zeal."
3 Part I surveys the law on the uses of seed, from planting for nonreproductive use to reverse-engineering and overt sales of patented seed. The Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 4 completes a cycle that began with the United States' adoption of the international framework for protecting new plant varieties. In a practical if not legal sense, seed saving has exhausted all avenues of recourse.
Part II places the practice of seed saving within its proper economic context. Seed saving is merely one of many traditional practices that contemporary agriculture has eroded. Seed saving, however, poses a uniquely powerful threat to the suppliers of agricultural inputs and to innovation within agribusiness. It has no place in a framework for agricultural policy based on the progress of science and the useful arts. Part III concludes that the decades-long obsession with seed saving has diverted legal attention from genuine problems arising from the intensive use of biotechnology in contemporary agriculture.
I. AN AGRICULTURALLY LITERATE SURVEY OF THE LAW OF SAVED SEED 5

A. Seed-Saving Basics: From Bin Run to Brown-Bagging
From the United States' accession in 1970 into the international legal system for protecting new plant varieties through the Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Bowman, controversies over seed-saving practices have clogged American agricultural law. These disputes have embroiled all branches of intellectual property law, from the law of trade secrets to patent law and the Plant Variety Protection Act, as well as cognate bodies of law such as antitrust. The connecting theme is as simple as it is consistent: farmers just want to save seed. As a federal court observed in one of many suits against Monsanto, the farmer's "real variety certificates.
14 The PVPA's decline can be traced to UPOV and a parallel development in international agricultural law. UPOV allowed its signatory countries to allow farmers to engage in the traditional practice of saving seed:
[E]ach Contracting Party may, within reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the breeder, restrict the breeder's right in relation to any variety in order to permit farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting, on their own holdings, the protected variety . . . . 15 UPOV carefully distinguished this "optional" saved-seed provision from three "compulsory" breeders' rights: "(i) acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes, (ii) acts done for experimental purposes and (iii) acts done for the purpose of breeding other varieties." 16 Whereas UPOV confined this optional exception to the saving of seed by farmers for use "on their own holdings," the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations issued a more aggressive interpretation of "farmers' rights." The FAO's Agreed Interpretation of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources crafted the "concept of Farmers' Rights" from its belief "that farmers of all regions have" made an "enormous contribution . . . to the conservation and development of plant genetic resources, which constitute the basis of plant production throughout the world."
17 Farmers' rights might be interpreted as supporting a stronger entitlement to save seed, not merely for future replanting, but also for resale to other farmers or perhaps even the development of new varieties. As subsequently codified in the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, the United Nations' view of farmers' rights imposed no 14 .
See CTR. FOR limit on "any rights that farmers have to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed/propagating material, subject to national law."
18
This returns the focus to domestic law. Section 113 of the PVPA, even before its amendment in 1994, has always allowed farmers to engage in a "bona fide sale for other than reproductive purposes, made in channels usual for such other purposes."
19 This exemption protects routine farmer-to-market sales of crops intended for use as food, feed, fiber, or fuel.
20
Section 113 has also permitted farmers "to save seed produced by [them] . . . from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and [to] use such saved seed in the production of a crop." 21 This exemption protects the traditional practice known as "bin run," or the use of seed from one crop to produce subsequent crops.
22 At least with respect to self-pollinated crops such as wheat, soybeans, and cotton-all of which reproduce true-to-typelegal protection of bin run effectively restricts a breeder to a single sale of each variety to each individual grower of a particular crop. 23 The bin run exemption is a robust version of copyright law's "first sale" doctrine 24 and patent law's closely related exhaustion doctrine 25 : the plant breeder gets exactly one chance to sell the information "encoded" in PVPA-certified seed to any individual farmer.
As originally enacted in 1970, the PVPA included a third exemption. Section 113's so-called "brown-bag" exemption allowed "a person, whose primary farming occupation is the growing of crops for sale for other than reproductive purposes, to sell such saved seed to other persons so engaged, Since 1994, the PVPA has conferred no brown-bagging privileges on farmers. In its current form, the PVPA exempts only two farmer-specific activities from its definition of infringement. First, the PVPA protects
[a] bona fide sale for other than reproductive purposes, made in channels usual for such other purposes, of seed produced on a farm either from seed obtained by authority of the owner for seeding purposes or from seed produced by descent on such 26 farm from seed obtained by authority of the owner for seeding purposes.
34
That provision's implicit immunity for seed saving, at least when permitted by the seller of the seed, is made explicit in the PVPA's protection of bin run:
Except to the extent that such action may constitute an infringement under subsections (3) and (4) of section 2541 of this title, it shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by the person from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on the farm of the person, or for sale as provided in this section.
35
B. Seed-Wrap Licensing
Contractual limitations on seeds have emerged even as statutory rights to save seed have receded. Plant breeders routinely require purchasers of PVPA-protected seed to waive their seed-saving rights through "seed-wrap" or "bag-tag" licenses printed on or attached to a bag of seed.
36
Seed-wrap licenses also accompany seeds protected by a utility patent. 37 In either instance, the plant breeder is using contract to privately secure rights akin to those ordinarily conferred through intellectual property legislation or, with respect to seed protected under the PVPA, to restore the breeder's legal control over plant genetics. 38 Critics of seed-wrap licensing had urged heavy reliance on an analogy to the patent misuse doctrine. 49 The patent misuse doctrine is designed "to prevent a patentee from using [a] patent to obtain market benefit beyond that which inheres in the statutory patent right." 50 For instance, patent law forbids "bald attempt[s]" to extend the exclusivity period of a patent through contracts purporting "to exact the same terms and conditions" as the statutory grant.
51
McFarling II, 52 decided in 2004, reformulated McFarling's tying claim as one "center[ed] on his desire to replant the entire seed" derived from the original bag of Roundup Ready® soybeans "and on Monsanto's refusal to grant him permission to do so." 53 McFarling proposed that farmers be allowed to "save and replant Roundup Ready® seed each year" upon payment of a technology fee in lieu of the existing arrangement by which farmers "purchase both the seed and the genetic technology together at the beginning of each growing season."
54
The Federal Circuit declined McFarling's invitation to establish "a compulsory license to use the patent rights in conjunction with . . . second-generation Roundup Ready® soybeans." 55 McFarling II did not "hold that Monsanto's raw exercise of its right to exclude from the patented invention by itself is . . . 'tying.'" 56 Although the court stopped short of holding that the licensing agreement imposed "permissible field-of-use restrictions on the first-generation seeds," 57 it did sustain the seed-saving prohibition on the reasoning that Monsanto's Roundup Ready® patent would embrace "all generations of soybeans produced." 58 Any restriction "prohibiting the replanting of" any subsequent "generation of Roundup Ready® soybeans" would accordingly "not extend Monsanto Id. at 1342.
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Id.; see also id. at 1344 ("McFarling is not alleging that he is unable to, or even that he desires to, purchase a 'natural' soybean seed and the Roundup Ready® genetic trait as distinct items; he alleges only that Monsanto refuses to grant him a license to use the second-generation . . . seeds . . . in his preferred manner.").
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The tying argument in
C. Chasing Selfs: The Reverse Engineering of Hybrid Seed
Bin run and brown-bagging are largely artifacts of plant reproduction. Crops such as wheat, soybeans, and cotton-which self-pollinate and reproduce true-to-type-are strong candidates for seed saving. A single generation of seed will provide multiple seasons of planting before losing ground to genetic drift. 62 Cross-pollinated hybrid crops, such as corn, sorghum, and sunflowers, are a different matter. Because these crops lose hybrid vigor after a single planting, farmers must buy new seed each planting season. 63 Thanks to this inherent protection-and the willingness of courts to protect the parentage of hybrid crops as trade secrets form of cultivar in many crops." 65 Hybrid corn, for instance, begins with the development of two inbred lines "by self-pollination and selection until [each] line is relatively homozygous." 66 The use of pollen from the male inbred line to fertilize silks on the female inbred line then produces hybrid seed. 67 The ease with which crops can be produced commercially on a hybrid basis is a function of plant biology. Different angiosperms (flowering plants) have fluctuated between outcrossing and self-pollination as reproductive strategies throughout their evolutionary history. 68 Traditionally associated with allogamous, or cross-pollinating, crops such as "maize, sunflower, brassicas, cucurbits, carrots, beets, and onions," the use of hybrid cultivars has become common even "in certain autogamous [self-pollinating] crops, including sorghum, tomato, and peppers" and in the production of allogamous crops in nonindustrialized countries. 69 Hybrid crops nevertheless remain vulnerable to an insidious, if clever, form of reverse engineering. Heterosis, or hybrid vigor, holds the key to hybrid crops' superior performance. 73 It also opens a back door to their underlying genetic secrets. Despite all precautions, each bag of hybrid seeds contains a small amount of inbred seeds. The "genetic purity of [a] breeder's seed . . . can be maintained by growing the crop in isolation and by rigorous roguing during different phases of crop growth." 74 Genetic purity "can be further enhanced by bulk selection, wherein 2000-2500 plants typical of the variety are selected, harvested, and threshed separately" so that "off-types, if any," may be discarded and the remaining "uniform seeds are bulked to constitute breeders seed." 75 Planting the resulting inbred seeds, or "selfs," reproduces the parent lines true-to-type. 76 With sufficient patience and land, a competing plant breeder, a farmer, or an academic researcher can use the technique of "chasing the selfs" to unlock the inbred parent lines of a hybrid variety. Planting all the seeds from a bag of hybrid seed in a configuration that puts adequate space between plants facilitates ready identification of any inadvertently included inbreds. Lacking heterosis, inbred plants look different from the taller hybrids.
77 Their leaves and tassels are smaller, and the plants themselves are shorter. The aesthetics of modern monocultures enables any farmer or plant (1971) (describing the inducement of self-incompatibility, through male sterility or otherwise, and efficient pollen transfer as prerequisites to the development of F 1 hybrids of naturally self-fertilized crops). The term "F 1 hybrid" refers to the first filial generation of offspring of distinctly different parental types. the case most often cited as recognizing the possibility of protecting the parentage of hybrid crops as a trade secret, the breeder asserting property in hybrid corn "presented no direct evidence regarding how Holden," a competing plant breeder, obtained proprietary germplasm. 80 But the founder of Holden admitted to "searching 'friendly farms' for stray inbred plants" and thereby "obtaining possession of several Pioneer lines."
81 That revelation in Pioneer can only be understood as an instance of reverse engineering through the exploitation of chasing selfs.
The significance of this conclusion cannot be overstated. The law of trade secrets ordinarily "does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means." 82 The law allows competitors to exploit "independent invention, accidental disclosure, or . . . so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or manufacture. Indeed, the reverse engineering of hybrid crops through chasing selfs has become such an expected element of the plant breeding industry that patent applications now routinely recite descriptions of the chasing selfs technique as a method for the production of inbred plants. 86 The irony is rich, and the circle is complete: Heterosis, which motivates breeders to develop new varieties and farmers to adopt them, enables unscrupulous seed purchasers and competing breeders to reverse engineer hybrid plants. As breeders continue their uptake of utility patents as their intellectual property form of choice, the chasing selfs technique has completed its transformation from reverse engineering tactic into an affirmative element of a patent application. Both female and male inbred seed may occasionally be found within a commercial bag of hybrid seed. Chasing the selfs involves identifying inbred plants within a stand of corn that has been grown from a bag of hybrid corn seed. Once the seed is planted, the inbred plants may be identified and selected due to their decreased vigor, i.e., by their short stature, narrower leaves, and smaller tassels relative to the hybrid plants that grow from the hybrid seed which predominates in a commercial bag of hybrid seed. By locating the inbred plants, isolating them from the rest of the plants, and self-pollinating them (i.e., "chasing selfs"), a breeder can obtain an inbred line that is identical to an inbred parent used to produce the hybrid. . . .
One having skill in the art will recognize that once a breeder has obtained inbred corn plant BE9513 by chasing selfs from a bag of hybrid seed, the breeder can then produce new inbred plants such as by sib-pollinating, i.e., crossing the inbred corn plant BE9513 with another inbred corn plant BE9513, or by crossing the inbred corn plant BE9513 with a hybrid corn plant obtained by the growing the collection of seed. Id. at col.11 l.60-col.12 l.5, col.12 ll.24-30.; see also Inbred Corn Line 1AA001, U.S. Patent No. 8,581,061 B1, at col.11 ll.41-53, col.12 ll.5-11 (filed Oct. 21, 2009) (issued Nov. 12, 2013).
D. Yeoman Bowman: Saved Seed and Patent Exhaustion
These developments presaged the pivotal 2013 Supreme Court decision in Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 87 That case decided "whether a farmer who buys patented seeds may reproduce them through planting and harvesting without the patent holder's permission" by dint of "the doctrine of patent exhaustion." 88 According to the patent exhaustion doctrine, "the authorized sale of a patented article gives the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, a right to use or resell that article," but not the right "to make new copies of the patented invention."
89 Bowman held that exhaustion does not permit the saving of patented seed. soybean crops derived from saved seeds and glyphosate-resistant commodity seeds that had survived his annual sieve of phytotoxicity.
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The Supreme Court swiftly dispatched Bowman's claim that the patent exhaustion doctrine would enable him "to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto's permission (either express or implied)." 97 To hold otherwise would have conferred "scant benefit" on Monsanto as the inventor of the Roundup Ready® trait. 98 After receiving some reward on its first sale of Roundup Ready® seeds, Monsanto would watch "other seed companies . . . reproduce the product and market it to growers." 99 The "farmers themselves" would "buy the seed [only] once, whether from Monsanto, a competitor, or . . . a grain elevator," thereby enabling themselves to "multiply [that] initial purchase, and then multiply that new creation, ad infinitum." 100 The Court rejected Bowman's plea to apply the exhaustion doctrine without exception to "patented seeds and other 'self-replicating technologies.'" 101 Although the Court declined to speculate how patent exhaustion might govern other "situation[s] . . . involving a self-replicating product," it concluded that the exhaustion doctrine "provides no haven for . . . conduct" that "depriv[es]" the inventor "of the reward patent law provides for the sale of each article."
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Bowman falls squarely within a legal trajectory that connects UPOV and the original version of the PVPA with seed-saving controversies such as Asgrow v. Winterboer, the McFarling cases, and Pioneer v. Holden. Each of these cases exposed the market-destroying potential of a seed-saving or reverse-engineering practice. Planting for nonreproductive use-eating, feeding, or milling-is the very purpose of all seed, without regard to its degree of genetic modification. Bin run is the traditional agrarian practice that UPOV, the United Nations' seed treaty, and the PVPA have all sought to protect. Bin run enables farmers to make a single purchase of proprietary seed and to save enough from each harvest to plant the next crop. But bin run's reduction of plant breeders' opportunity for profit to a single sale to each farmer has aligned every other source of law, from seed-wrap licensing to trade secret and the Patent Act, against even this most modest form of seed saving.
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Id All other seed-saving practices constitute naked attacks on the profitability of seed breeding. Brown-bag sales enable farmers to compete directly against breeders as vendors of engineered seed. If defined as permissible reverse engineering rather than unlawful infringement, the discovery of hybrid crops' inbred parent lines through the chasing selfs technique would erase any benefit from the protection of hybrid plant varieties as trade secrets. Vernon Bowman's eight crops of glyphosate-resistant soybeans, all drawn from commodity beans to the exclusion of licensed sales by Monsanto or an authorized dealer, testify vividly to the wicked cleverness of Bowman's evasion of the Roundup Ready® patent. The sheer breadth of his claim under patent law's exhaustion doctrine raised the very conflict between seed saving and biotechnological innovation that a federal appeals court recognized in the context of the PVPA:
While the main body of the Act assures developers of novel varieties the exclusive right to sell and reproduce that variety, the crop exemption dilutes that exclusivity by allowing individual farmers to sell the protected variety without liability. The broader the construction given the exemption, the smaller the incentive for breeders to invest the substantial time and effort necessary to develop new strains. The less time and effort that is invested, the smaller the chance of discovering superior agricultural products.
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II. THE NATURE OF THE FARM: AN INDUSTRIALIST MANIFESTO
This much is evident from the foregoing summary of the law of saved seed: an immense amount of energy-on farms, in laboratories, and in law offices-has been devoted to finding ways for farmers to save seed rather than having to buy new seed each season. This obsession has inflicted deep harm on agricultural innovation. Lingering uncertainty over the ability to enforce single-use restrictions on engineered seed has driven biotechnology companies to develop hybrid crops at the expense of crops reproducing true-to-type. 104 Motivating inventors to rely on the law of trade secrets rather than the PVPA or patent law defeats the broader constitutional interest in " Absent more secure intellectual property rights for their inventions, biotechnology companies face strong incentives to devise genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs), the biological equivalent of anti-circumvention and digital rights management software. 110 Because every investment in GURTs diverts resources that could have been aimed at improving crops' agronomic and nutritional attributes, the whole enterprise reeks of enforcing legal rights at the expense of actual innovation. 111 The inclusion of GURTs in new crops will retard future dissemination, when those crops' underlying patents expire (as they eventually must) and biotechnology rather than law stands as the greatest barrier to the diffusion and uptake of new technology. Meanwhile, significant issues involving the most popular lines of bioengineered crops elude satisfactory legal resolution, partly because farmers and their advocates persist in treating the disruption of biotechnology companies' profits as a surrogate for direct, meaningful engagement of uncomfortable environmental issues in agriculture.
Farmers have traditionally regarded their farms as environmentally and economically self-contained enterprises. 112 Once established, a farm should supply its own inputs, from seed for the next planting season to fertilizer derived from animal waste. But the history of all hitherto existing agriculture is the history of vertical integration and coordination.
113 Agriculture has always endured progressive rounds of technological innovation and uptake, accompanied by economic and social disruption on and off the farm.
In 1949, at the dawn of the Green Revolution, 114 the Supreme Court recognized the inevitability of technological transformation in agriculture:
Agriculture, as an occupation, includes more than the elemental process of planting, growing and harvesting crops. . . . Whether a particular type of activity is agricultural depends, in large measure, upon the way in which that activity is organized in a particular society. . . . In less advanced societies the agricultural function includes many types of activity which, in others, are not agricultural. The fashioning of tools, the provision of fertilizer, the processing of the product, to mention only a few examples, are functions which, in some societies, are performed on the farm by farmers as part of their normal agricultural routine. Economic progress, however, is characterized by a progressive division of labor and separation of function. Tools are made by a tool manufacturer, who specializes in that kind of work and supplies them to the farmer. The compost heap is replaced by factory-produced fertilizers. Power is derived from electricity and gasoline rather than supplied by the farmer's mules. Wheat is ground at the mill. In this way, functions which are necessary to the total economic process of supplying an agricultural product, become, in the process of economic development and specialization, separate and independent productive functions operated in conjunction with the agricultural function but no longer a part of it.
115
In the nearly contemporaneous case of Wickard v. Filburn, 116 arguably the most important agricultural law case in American history, 117 the Supreme Court likewise acknowledged the link between technological innovation on the farm and economic upheaval throughout society. Wheat that "is never marketed . . . supplies a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market." 118 The price support program upheld in Filburn "forc[ed] some farmers into the market to buy what they could provide for themselves" and represented "an unfair promotion of the markets and prices of specializing wheat growers."
119 There is no stronger legal endorsement of Ronald Coase's Nobel Prize-winning observation that vertical integration and open-market purchases are flip sides of the same economic phenomenon.
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In legal terms, these Supreme Court controversies presented Coase's key economic question: "Why is not all production carried on by one big firm?" 121 By 1957, Harvard economists invented a new word-"agribusiness"-to describe "the sum total of all operations involved in the manufacture and distribution of farm supplies; production operations on the farm; and the storage, processing, and distribution of farm commodities and items made from them." 122 Traditional agriculture-"more or less a self-contained industry" characterized by "typical farm famil [ies] " that "produced [their] own food, fuel, shelter, draft animals, feed, tools, and implements and even most of [their] clothing"-was rapidly disappearing. 123 Marginal farms folded, average farm size mushroomed, and industry began performing "virtually all [the] operations relating to growing, processing, storing, and merchandising food and fiber" that had been "a function of the farm." 124 Vertical integration on the farm dictates vertical integration of the farm. Whence the nature of the firm, thither the destiny of the farm.
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Against this tide of truth stands a peculiar and puny form of agrarian exceptionalism. Seed, so the story goes, simply seems different. There is little if any controversy today over the reliance of farmers on off-farm sources for fertilizer, fuel, pesticides, and veterinary services and supplies. There are justifiably robust debates over organic production, no-till practices, integrated pest management, and subtherapeutic administration of antibiotics to farm animals. None of these controversies, however, has sparked accusations that a particular form of biotechnology has subjected farmers as a class to domination by agribusiness. "At the heart of [agrarian] liberty," as it were, lies the right to save seed and, with it, "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."
126 "Beliefs about . . . matters" this intimate "could not define the attributes of [agrarian] personhood were they formed under [economic] compulsion."
127 Being forced to procure seed from off-farm sources, season after season, represents a unique affront to agrarian sensibilities.
Two instinctive reactions may explain why farmers have fought so hard to save seed. Intellectual property law gives no support to either of those instincts. First, farmers quite naturally (but just as erroneously) assume that seeds as chattels and seeds as code are one and the same. Consequently, farmers assume that their mastery of seeds as chattels, from planting through harvesting, entitles them to control the genetic information coded in seeds through decisions about whether to save or sell some portion of each crop.
But the embodiment of proprietary DNA-seed as code-in the physical vessel of seed as chattel does not unite the ownership of intellectual and physical property. In this respect, the farmer buying Roundup Ready® soybeans has no greater claim to save seed than the owner of "tangible property," such as the letters of J.D. Salinger, may assert over "the literary property rights" belonging to Salinger as the author of those letters. The typical farmer's second instinctive basis for chafing at restrictions on seed saving fares no better. Cultivating crops from planting to harvest is hard work. The sweat of their brows, so it may be argued, confers upon farmers a moral, if not strictly legal, right to save seed. The Supreme Court has "emphatically rejected" any theory that would confer intellectual property rights through the sweat of the brow. 129 Whatever else the law might glean from the philosophy of John Locke, 130 the labor theory of property offers no basis for a right to save seed.
To be sure, seed can be lawfully saved-provided that it is not subject to patent or to contractual restrictions imposed by the breeder. Public varieties contain no such limits on seed saving. Thanks to their devotion to the ideology of agrarian self-sufficiency, most developers of organic and heirloom varieties eschew limits on seed saving. These seeds offer none of the traits that make proprietary varieties so popular. But they can be saved. For farmers whose self-actualization hinges on the ability to save seed, these varieties offer an emotional and philosophical refuge.
Disputes over the ownership of plant genetic material have sparked emotionally explosive battles, not least because narratives about agriculture and the environment dominate cosmological stories of origin. 131 The "intense spiritual feelings" derived from nature's "unfathomable complexity and . . . sublime beauty" 132 turn quickly into spite once humans attend the gritty business of making a living-or a killing-from natural resources. "Rise, Peter; kill and eat."
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Agriculture invokes the mysteries of life. 134 The deceptively simple act of planting seed conceals an enterprise "so vast that fully to comprehend it would require an almost universal knowledge ranging from geology, biology, chemistry and medicine to the niceties of the legislative, judicial and administrative processes of government." 135 To understand seed saving and reverse engineering in the proper agricultural context, however, we must demystify the entire process. Seed saving imperils biotechnological innovation in agriculture, for no greater benefit than the putative independence of farmers.
The seed bridges several biological and metaphorical divides. Among drivers of evolution, two forces tower above all others. One of them is food. The other is sex. The seed is both. "It is both means of production and, as grain [ recapitulate phylogeny. 139 Programming genetic code into seeds further "blurs the line between law and artifact, and promises to challenge long-held assumptions in the legal regime of ownership and control over . . . biological creations." 140 Seeds present no fewer problems for the law of intellectual property than do pharmaceutical products. Drugs are exceptionally susceptible to unauthorized duplication because they are durable, subject to intense demand, relatively inexpensive to produce, easily transported, and readily imitated at a minute fraction of the original research and development costs. 141 Drugs heed no "natural physical barriers that exclude potential consumers," "may be held by more than one person at a time," can be distributed at "minimal or nonexistent" cost, and, once disclosed, face "no real barriers to free appropriation." 142 Seeds inject a further complication. At least in the case of self-pollinating plants, seeds reproduce of their own accord. 143 In other settings, "[t]echnology generally is used as a tool to make something else or as a component in making something else but not to make a new version of itself."
144 "Copying," a deviant and difficult deed in many other industries, is the definition of agriculture. Whether they cultivate plants or raise animals, 145 farmers specialize in inducing living organisms to reproduce.
Plant breeders therefore face two sources of competitive pressure whenever they release seed into the market. Not only must they fend off competing breeders, but every customer is also a potential rival. 146 Self-replication, in other words, "is an extreme form of self-disclosure." 147 As the prime example of a self-replicating technology, seeds "don't merely teach competitors how to practice a new invention"; they "supply . . . competitors with a factory."
148 "[C]onflict arises because every customer could become [a] competitor[] as the product replicates, potentially making every first sale the patentee's last."
149 "From the standpoint of a producer of innovation, the notion of a self-replicating invention presents as compelling a case for intellectual property intervention as can be imagined." 150 
III. THIS IS THE DAWNING OF THE AGE OF ORGANOPHOSPHORUS
Patent law is patently amoral. 151 In any of its guises, intellectual property law makes an exceptionally poor vehicle for addressing matters of "aesthetics and morals." 152 The Roundup Ready® trait at the heart of so many seed-saving controversies deserves close scrutiny. There are many reasons to condemn the prevalence-the utter ubiquity-of the American soybean industry's technological monoculture. The royalties that farmers must pay in the absence of a right to save seed do not rank among those reasons.
The transgenic modification of crops has occasioned a decrease in the application of chemical insecticides, coupled with a dramatic increase in the application of broad-spectrum herbicides. 153 One serious concern that seed-saving disputes have all but obscured is the ecological and evolutionary damage attributable to the nearly universal adoption of herbicide-resistant crops. In the 1980s, plant scientists discovered how to translate a mutation in the 5-enolpyruvylshikimate 3-phosphate synthase (EPSP synthase) gene in the bacterium Salmonella typhimurium into glyphosate tolerance in crop plants. 154 By 2013, 71 percent of all corn, 90 percent of all cotton, and 93 percent of all soybeans planted in the United States had been genetically engineered to resist herbicides. 155 The alternative to blanket applications of broad-spectrum herbicide readily explains the popularity of herbicide-resistant crops. Herbicides and herbicide-resistant crops are substitutes for physical labor of the most demoralizing sort. Without herbicides, the farmer has no choice but to remove weeds by raw force. In the case of cotton, the physical alternative of chopping is particularly brutal:
In order to produce a good cotton crop, cotton should be chopped in the summertime-the job simply involves chopping or hoeing the weeds out of the rows of growing cotton. It is a menial, unskilled task which requires no aptitude, no training, and no ability to reason. It is a work of drudgery . . . accomplished with a simple instrument-the hoe. 156 James Agee, a giant of twentieth-century American literature, vividly expressed this sentiment:
Chopping is a simple hard and hot job. It is simply thinning the cotton to a stand, hills a foot to sixteen inches apart, two to four stalks to the hill; done with an eight-to ten-inch hoeblade. You cut the cotton flush to the ground, with a semi-blow of the blade that aches first the forearms and in time the whole spine.
Glyphosate, the active ingredient in Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, arguably represents the leading cause for concern. Monocultures consisting of a single glyphosate-resistant crop variety, such as Roundup Ready® soybeans, invite multiple applications, season after season, of glyphosate. Repeated use of a single herbicide exerts intense selection pressure on plants and gives rise to herbicide-tolerant and herbicide-resistant "superweeds." 158 Almost immediately after Monsanto released seeds incorporating Roundup Ready® technology, the first cases of glyphosate resistance in rigid ryegrass (Lolium rigidum) were documented in Australia. 159 Glyphosate-resistant ryegrass has now been detected around the world. 160 Glyphosate resistance has been reported in Palmer amaranth, or pigweed (Amaranthus palmeri); 161 164 and goosegrass (Eleusine indica). 165 In the case of common lambsquarters (Chenopodium album), a weed of special concern to corn and soybean farmers, 166 the discovery of glyphosate resistance 167 is particularly dispiriting. Glyphosate had emerged as a solution to older herbicides affected by the EPA's acceptance of the voluntary cancellation and amendments to terminate the use of organic arsenicals, including the pesticides monosodium methanearsonate (MSMA), disodium methanearsonate (DSMA), calcium acid methanearsonate (CAMA), and cacodylic acid and its sodium salt, under Section 6(f)(1) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 168 As resistance to glyphosate proliferates in geographic space and across biological taxa, we may soon reach-if we have not already surpassed-the point of "peak glyphosate," the moment where we can foresee the decline in effectiveness and the eventual commercial extinction of this herbicide. 169 Pending glyphosate's gradual but inevitable slide into biologically compelled desuetude, we must remember that pesticides and herbicides do not go gentle into that good night. 170 Despite its notorious reputation as an endocrine disruptor and an emasculator of frogs, 171 the much older and more environmentally treacherous atrazine remains the leading herbicide in the United States. 172 Glyphosate surely will rage, rage against the dying of its light. 173 Whatever its other implications for intellectual property law and the economics of American agriculture, 174 the impending expiration of Monsanto's patent on the Roundup Ready® trait in soybeans will almost certainly expand the use of glyphosate and the rate at which non-crop plants evolve resistance to that herbicide. After the expiration of that patent in 2015, after all, farmers can save first-generation Roundup Ready® soybean seeds with impunity and sell them for any nonreproductive or reproductive purpose. 175 Meanwhile, superweed resistance to glyphosate has spurred the development of crops engineered to tolerate another organophosphorus compound with broad-spectrum herbicidal qualities, glufosinate. 176 Bayer CropScience, a leading rival to Monsanto, has incorporated glufosinate resistance into soybeans, cotton, corn, and canola 177 and intends to expand production of the herbicide itself. 178 Atrazine yesterday, glyphosate today, glufosinate tomorrow.
For all of these problems, there is no simple solution. 179 One by one, broad-spectrum herbicides crippled by the emergence of resistance in a wide variety of superweed species may face possible cancellation, or at least a change in their classification, under Section 6(b) of FIFRA.
180
Contemporary agriculture has ascended the treadmill of the gods, biotechnology as the great conveyor belt of good and evil. What is certain is that the terms by which farmers must pay for access to biotechnology and, critically, must refrain from saving herbicide-resistant seed, has no impact on the truly grand questions of environmental integrity. Seed saving and agrarian tradition offer little succor in a world where food security remains elusive 181 and the ghost of Malthus still stalks. 182 For the harvest is past, the summer is ended, and seed is not saved. 
